With federal agencies scaling back investigations and enforcement, the U.S. still has a second layer of law enforcement that most countries lack: private rights of action. Stanford Law professor Diego Zambrano argues in his new book that ordinary citizens and businesses have long been empowered by statute to sue to enforce public law, from wage and hour rules to environmental protections. This system, built on thousands of 'right to sue' provisions, turns plaintiffs into what courts sometimes call private attorneys general.
Zambrano traces the practice to colonial 'penal statutes' that let private informers collect bounties for reporting violations, and notes that the Founders themselves used such tools. The approach remains unusual internationally: after the Exxon Valdez spill, U.S. plaintiffs sued directly and Congress added a new right to sue, while France responded to the similar Erika spill mainly with criminal prosecution and new regulatory agencies. Because private enforcement is dispersed, it is less subject to the shifting priorities of any single administration.
However, Zambrano cautions that private enforcement is not always the right fix. Broad rights to challenge government approvals can be used to obstruct housing, transit, and clean energy projects. He cites a Maryland lawsuit backed by a country club that delayed the Purple Line light-rail project for years. The lesson is that while private lawsuits can fill gaps left by a retreating bureaucracy, they can also become a tool for blocking public goods.