A new preprint on arXiv presents a reaction attack against deployments of the CKKS homomorphic encryption scheme. The attack targets a protocol-level information leak that arises when public coefficient-to-slot (C2S) evaluation keys are used together with a client's 1-bit validity response. In this setting, a malicious evaluator can exploit the client's reaction to infer information about the encrypted data.

The authors show that the attack achieves asymptotically optimal query complexity, meaning the number of queries required is minimal in the asymptotic sense. This makes the attack efficient and highlights a practical risk for real-world CKKS deployments that expose such validity responses.

The work underscores that security in homomorphic encryption depends not only on the underlying mathematical assumptions but also on how the scheme is deployed. Protocol-level reactions, such as validity responses, can create side channels that undermine confidentiality even when the cryptographic core remains sound.